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Introduction
In less than a decade, the world has witnessed monumental
changes in trade relations and intellectual property protection among
nations. In 1988, the United States became a member of the Berne
Union.' It was the last holdout amongst major developed countries to
join the Berne Convention, which created the Union in 1896 to pro-
vide uniform minimal levels of protection for literary and artistic
works with the least procedural formalities.2 In 1989, the Canada/
United States Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) went into effect.3 It
contained an "exemption" for Canada's cultural industries4 which
United States Trade Representatives vociferously opposed but with-
out which Canada would not have entered into the Agreement.5 In
1992, Canada, Mexico, and the United States signed the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 6 which included significant in-
tellectual property provisions 7 while maintaining Canada's so-called
"cultural exemption. '"8
Less than a month after the battle to pass NAFTA in the U.S.
Congress was won,9 the world was fixated on the completion of the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)"° taking place in Brussels and Geneva." A controversy
arose between the United States, more specifically its film industry,
1. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of Sept. 9,
1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1886, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, revised at
Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels on June 26,
1948, revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended
on Oct. 2, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter "Berne"].
The United States ratified the Convention on October 31, 1988. Since treaties are gener-
ally not self-executing in the United States, the Berne Convention, along with the Berne
Convention Implementation Act, did not become effective in the U.S. until March 1, 1989.
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codi-
fied at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 116, 301, 401-402, 404-408, 801 (1988)).
2. STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS
98-100 (2d ed. 1989).
3. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinaf-
ter CFTA]; United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988).
4. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 21, arts. 2005, 2012, 27 I.L.M. at 396, 398.
5. M. Peter McPherson, Comments, in THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT. THE GLOBAL IMPAcT 190 (Jeffrey J. Scott & Murray G. Smith eds., Institute
for International Economics, 1988).
6. North American Free Trade Agreement, Nov. 17, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [here-
inafter NAFTA].
7. Id., ch. 17, 32 I.L.M. at 399.
8. Id., art. 2106 and annex 2106, 32 I.L.M. at 399.
9. Michael Wines, The Free Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al.
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATr].
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and France, over the latter's refusal to include cultural industries
within the new agreement. 12 France, supported by most of the Euro-
pean Union,'3 and Canada, though silent,' 4 wanted its European
broadcasting content requirements and cinema tax, used to support its
cultural industries, excluded from the new GATI' agreements. The
United States, as in its prior negotiations with Canada, wanted cul-
tural industries included. 15 To paraphrase former President George
Bush, the line in the sand was drawn and the United States lost again.
This paper will explore the reasons why cultural and copyright
industries, cinema in particular, have become so important in interna-
tional law and trade. It will examine how the United States has man-
aged to become the most successful purveyor of cultural "content" on
a world wide basis' 6 by analyzing the manner in which its copyright
laws differ from those of other affected nations, namely Canada,
France, and Mexico. This paper will also study the United States' ef-
forts to have the copyright laws of other nations changed to protect
creative works through the CFTA, NAFTA, and GATT, as well as
through its accession to the Berne Convention. If an underlying thesis
girds this article, it is that national laws and international conventions
tend to reflect the particular biases of their representative states,
sometimes subtly, and provide reasons and answers not facially obvi-
ous for the problems that have plagued international trade in copy-
righted materials for decades. It is one thing to say, "[t]he Americans
just don't get it."' 7 It is another to decipher some of the overlooked
reasons why the United States has at the same time succeeded and
failed in recent trade negotiations to have copyrighted content treated
like any other goods subject to trade.
One important reason is the different treatment authors receive
in the United States than in practically any other country in the world.
This is reflected in U.S. copyright law and the sparse protection it pro-
11. Roger Cohen, Culture Dispute With Paris Now Snags World Accord, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1993, at A1; Roger Cohen, Film Issue Snags Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
1993, at Al.
12. Cohen, supra note 11; Jeffrey Goodell, Salut Suckers, PREMIERE, Apr. 1994, at 131.
13. Roger Cohen, Europeans Back French Curbs on U.S. Movies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1993, § 1, at 24.
14. Paul Gessell, Culture Industry Rallies to Back Protectionism, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
Dec. 10, 1993, at D6.
15. Roger Cohen, With Time Waning, Europeans Reject U.S. Movie Compromise, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at Al.
16. John Rockwell, The New Colossus: American Culture as Power Export, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994, §2, at 1.
17. Paul Gessell, Canadian "Xenophobia" Is Paying Off-For Now, VANCOUVER SUN,
Dec. 16, 1993, at D7.
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vides for the droit moral of authors. Before looking at this system,
this paper will examine droit moral, in the context of the Berne Con-
vention to which the United States is now a signatory..
I
Droit Moral and Berne
On March 1, 1989, the United States' accession to the Berne Con-
vention became effective under the Berne Convention Implementa-
tion Act (BCIA).18 By becoming a member of the Berne Union, the
United States committed itself to protecting the droit moral, the moral
rights, of authors as spelled out in Article 6bis of the Berne Conven-
tion.19 Paragraph (1) of Article 6bis states:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after
the transfer of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor and reputation.20
As the first clause of 6bis entails, moral rights are distinguished
from the economic rights an author has in his or her work of expres-
21sion. The typical economic rights protected by copyright law are:
the right to make copies; the right to adapt, translate, or create deriva-
tive works based on the original work; the right to broadcast and
cablecast; the right to perform and display the work; and the right to
distribute the work. 22 Droit moral, as the designation indicates, first
arose under French law of droit d'auteur, which translates to authors'
rights.23 An immediate distinction can be seen between copyright,
which arose under the common law system prohibiting copying, and
authors' rights, which arose under the French and other civil law sys-
tems to protect the property created by the author.24 Where copyright
was created in England under the Statute of Anne to protect publish-
ers under the guise of protecting authors,25 droit d'auteur was thought
18. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 116, 301, 401-402, 404-408, 801 (1988)); supra note
1.
19. Berne, supra note 1, art. 6bis.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. STEWART, supra note 2, § 4.17.
23. Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Art-
ists' Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 7-11 (1980); Dan
Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution, an American Revolution, 2 CAR-
DOZO ART & Err. L.J. 155, 157-58 (1983).
24. STEWART, supra note 2, §§ 1.13-1.16.
25. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT .35-48
(1993).
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to exist independent of any statute.26 The rights existed in the author;
a natural right to possess the fruits of his or her labor.2 7 In the United
States and the United Kingdom, copyright is deemed to be purely a
creature of statute.28 By contrast, droit d'auteur, particularly in
France, was protected by the courts and not truly codified until 1957.29
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention establishes two moral rights
to be protected by members of the Berne Union.3 ° The first is the
right, to claim authorship,3' commonly called the right of attribution.32
The second is the right of integrity. 33
The right of attribution has been recognized to consist of many
different obligations. One is the right to be recognized as the author
of one's work. A second is the right to prevent attribution of one's
work to someone else. A third is the right to prevent "passing off,"
being named the author of a work one did not create.34 It is question-
able whether the right of attribution under the Berne Convention was
meant to include the second and third obligations listed. Under U.S.
copyright law, it is possible for one's authorship not to be recognized
in employment and other situations under the work for hire doc-
26. STEWART, supra note 2, § 1.14.
27. Id.
28. Donaldson v. Becket, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774); Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591,661-62
(1834).
29. Rosen, supra note 23, at 158; Loi no. 57-298 du 11 mars 1957 sur La propridt6
litteraire artistique, translated in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD (1993) [hereinafter France].
30. Commentators have found that many other branches exist in droit moral. Apart
from the right of integrity and of attribution protected by Article 6bis of Berne, there are:
the right 'to create, the right to publish or not to publish one's work, the right of disclosure
or divulgation, the right to 'withdraw or modify one's work, even after one's work has
already been released for sale, and the right against excessive or vexatious criticism. See
Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study, in the Law of Artists, Authors
and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1940); Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks &
Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Study No. 4,
The Moral Right of the Author (1960) (Strauss); Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the
Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. Comp,. L. 465 (1968);
DaSilva, supra note 23; Rosen, supra note 23; Carl H. Settlemyer III, Note, Between
Thought and Possession: Artists' "Moral Rights" and Public Access to Creative Works, 81
GEO. L.J. 2291 (1993).
31. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 467 (1987).
32. This right has also been called the right of paternity. Because of the sexist over-
tones implicit in such a designation, the term "attribution" will be used in this article. The
designation of the right as one of attribution is relatively recent, and may itself smack of
political correctness, but sometimes even the worst of intentions can achieve desirable
results.
33. RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 468.
34. DaSilva, supra note 23, at 26.
35. RiCKETSON, supra note 31, at 467-68.
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trine.36 Article 6bis, in contrast, makes clear that moral rights remain
with the author, "even after the transfer" of the economic rights.37
The real issue has become whether moral rights can be waived or
sold.38 Even in France, where the highest degree of protection of droit
moral can be found, waivers are often allowed.39
The right of integrity to one's work, unlike the right of attribu-
tion, is fairly well described in article 6bis. It is the right to prevent
changes from being made to one's work which would be "prejudicial"
to the author's "honor or reputation."40 It is contended to be "the
most essential part of droit moral."'4 1 However, even this right has not
escaped controversy since it does not prevent destruction of a work,42
nor is it clear WHAT honor or reputation is being protected: Is it the
author's reputation as an artist or as an individual? 43 Can an inani-
mate object ever have a protected honor or reputation?"
36. In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work "was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of
the rights comprised in the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). See
also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
37. Berne, supra note 1, art. 6bis, par. (1).
38. The U.S. Copyright Act would apparently allow alienation except in the case of
works of visual art. 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(d), 106A(e) (1988). Works of visual art, as defined in
the Copyright Act, do not include motion pictures. Id. § 101. See infra notes 61-63 and
accompanying text. The moral rights section of Canada's Copyright Act states that moral
rights are not assignable, but may be waived. Copyright Act, R.S.C. ch. C-42, amended by
R.S.C. ch. 10 (1st Supp. 1985), ch. 1 (3d Supp. 1985), ch. 41 (3d Supp. 1985), ch. 10 § 14.1(3)
(4th Supp. 1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Can. Copyrt. Act]. The French statute bars aliena-
tion, France, supra note 29, art. 6, as does Mexico's, Ley Federal de Derochos de Autor,
D.O., Dec. 21, 1963, art. 3, translated in UNESCO, COPYRiGHr LAWS AND TREATIES OF
THE WORLD (1993) [hereinafter Mexico]. It has been argued that Article 6bis was meant
to bar alienation of droits moral. David Vaver, Authors' Moral Rights - Reform Proposals
in Canada: Charter or Barter of Rights for Creators?, 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 749, 771
(1987). Sam Ricketson, in a close study of the text (as opposed to the travaux
preparatoires), argues that there is nothing to prohibit even the transfer of moral rights.
RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 467.
39. DaSilva, supra note 23, at 16.
40. Bere, supra note 1, art. 6bis(l).
41. DaSilva, supra note 23, at 31.
42. RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 470; DaSilva, supra note 23, at 33. One of the few
areas where the U.S. Copyright Act does provide more protection than that required by
Article 6bis is in section 106A: "[T]he author of a visual work of art ... shall have the right
•.. to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right." 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(a)(3)(B) (1988).
43. Ricketson argues that it is the personal reputation that is protected, and looks to
the travaux prdparatoire to justify the argument. It is clear from his argument, however,
that "consensus" was not clearly established since some parties were confused by the
meaning of the final text. RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 471.
44. DaSilva's seminal article on droit moral seemed to be inching towards just such an
argument. His concern, especially where collaborative works were involved, such as mo-
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.France's authors' rights statute, like most copyright statutes, dis-
tinguishes between economic rights (droits patrimoniaux) and droit
moral.4" Economic rights, as in most countries, are alienable and
fixed for a particular term, usually the life of the author plus fifty
years, after which they enter the public domain for all to enjoy.16 The
moral rights, however, are "perpetual, inalienable and cannot be pre-
scribed. '47 Mexico has a similar provision for moral rights in its au-
thors' rights statute.48 The Berne Convention, however, does not
require a signatory to go as far as France or Mexico. Paragraph (2) of
article 6bis states:
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preced-
ing paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the
expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the per-
sons or institutions authorized by legislation of the country where
protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation,
at the moment of ratification of or accession to this Act, does not
provide for the protection after the death of the author of all rights
set out in the preceding paragraph may-provide that some of these
rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.49
This is where some of the theoretical confusion over moral rights
has arisen. Under the dualist view, led by France, droit moral, as dis-
tinguished from economic rights, are personal to the author and can-
not be waived or sold.50 This explains why France views droit moral as
tion pictures, plays, and operas, was that a lone artist among many could place an eco-
nomic stranglehold on a whole endeavor simply by claiming violation of his or her droit
moral. DaSilva, supra note 23, at 32. But by placing honor and reputation in the work
instead of with the author risks a theoretical inconsistency that could eviscerate the moral
rights doctrine. Droits moral are personal to the author. Once separated therefrom, what
is to distinguish them from the economic rights of copyright? See supra note 27 and ac-
companying text.
45. France, supra note 29, art. 1; Can. Copyrt. Act, supra note 38, §§ 3 & 14.1; Mexico,
supra note 38, art. 2; but cf U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 & 106A.
46. France, supra note 29, art. 21; Can. Copyrt. Act, supra note 38, § 5; U.S. Copyright
Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305.
47. France, supra note 29, art. 6.
48. Mexico, supra note 38, art. 3.
49. Berne, supra note 1, art. 6bis, par. (2).
50. RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 458; DaSilva, supra note 23, at 9-11. Of course, as
seen above, supra note 39 and accompanying text, even France has not been absolutist in
its application of this theory. Most of the debate between the monist and dualist views
originated in Germany between Joseph Kohler and Alfred Gierke. DaSilva, supra note 23,
at 10-11. They, in turn, built upon ideas developed in France, under the influence of Marx-
ist theory, which opposed characterization of droit d'auteur as property. Id. at 10. Conse-
quently, French courts began distinguishing between droit moral and economic rights,
causing the split. Id. As DaSilva explains it, "[t]he author has, in a sense, made a gift of his
creative genius to the world; in return, he has a right-a moral right-to expect that society
respect his creative genius." Id. at 12. Because of this, France views the right as perpetual
and inalienable. Id.
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perpetual,51 and why droit moral cannot be found in corporations or
other business organizations in France.5 2 This view has been espe-
cially detrimental for producers of motion pictures in France. Since
there is a constant risk that one of the creative contributors to a film
will make a claim that his or her moral rights are infringed, the eco-
nomic risks to film producers are considerably heightened. There is
no one "author" of a film for authors' rights purposes in France. 4
51. DaSilva, supra note 23, at 12.
52. Id.
53. In fact, France has tried to face the problem in Articles 14 to 17 of its droit
d'auteur. France, supra note 29, arts. 14-17. Article 14 limits the number of authors to the
scriptwriter, the script adaptor, the writer of the dialogue, the composer of the music cre-
ated specifically for the film, and the director. Id. art. 14. All other contributors, including
the cinematographer and set designer, are excluded. If the screenplay is an adaption from
a preexisting work, the original author will be included in the list. Id. Notice that the
film's producers (the persons, business, or entities that finance the film) are not included as
authors.
Article 15 bars an author from prohibiting the use of his or her uncompleted work. Id.
art. 15. It does not say the author may not bar its use when his or her work is completed.
Producers make their first appearance in Article 16. This article determines when the' film
is deemed completed. Id. art. 16. This occurs after consultation between the director and
the producer or, "as the case may be, the co-authors and the producer." Id. Article 17
allows for the possibility of the producer being one of the authors, and gives the producer
the power to exploit the film as to the economic rights included therein. Id. art. 17. Thus
the risk still exists for a disgruntled author to insist that his or her droit moral is infringed
by the final product. This thus places the producer in the position of having to consult with
the film's co-authors.
Today, there are very few directors in Hollywood, the so-called movie capital of the
world, who have final say, and in some cases, any input, in the final presentation of a film.
During the years of the "studio system," when practically everyone in Hollywood films was
under contract to the major film studios, instead of being independent contractors as the
case is today, directors had even less power. The producer or film studio always retained
that power. See, e.g., THOMAS ScHATz, THE GENIUS OF THE SYSTEM: HOLLYWOOD FILM-
MAKING IN THE STUDIO ERA (1988).
54. It has been noted that droit moral shares a strong link with the romantic notion of
authorship. Christopher Aide, A More Comprehensive SouL Romantic Conceptions of
Authorship and the Copyright Doctrine of Moral Right, 48 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 211
(1990). What is very interesting to note in historical perspective is that the "auteur" theory
of cinema originated in France, in the periodical Cahiers du Cinema. Louis G. GIANNETTI,
UNDERSTANDING MOVIES 274-75, 437-443 (2d ed. 1976). This theory: which emphasizes
the contributions made by the film's director, and, to a certain extent, the screenwriter,
began at about the same time that France codified its droit d'auteur. Id. at 274. "Im-
ported" to the United States by U.S. film critic Andrew Sarris, Id. at 440, the auteur the-
ory's influence is felt even today, despite the reality that, at least in the United States, films
are generally works made for hire, supra note 36 and accompanying text, controlled by film
producers and motion picture studios. The Alfred Hitchcocks and Steven Spielbergs are
rare in North America. See also infra note 63. French droit d'auteur, on the other hand,
makes a strong case for the auteurist theory as applied to French productions. The films of
Jean-Luc Goddard, Claude Chabrol, and Jean Cocteau make good arguments for the the-
ory; application to U.S. cinema, as former New Yorker film critic Pauline Kael argued
throughout much of her career, is inaccurate.
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The monist view, originally developed in Germany and favored by
Canada55 (and, to the extent moral rights exist within its Copyright
Act, the United States), 6 takes the position that moral rights and eco-
nomic rights are coextensive and cannot be so easily separated.57
Waivers of moral rights are more easily obtained and the initial risk to
producers, if any, are therefore minimized.
The first sentence of paragraph (2) of article 6bis takes a neutral
approach to the monist/dualist debate,58 allowing both to exist in the
Berne Union. The second sentence, however, refers to countries like
the United States who either historically have not provided moral
rights to authors in their copyright laws, or whose equivalents to those
rights do not extend after the death of the author. 59 The provision
was included in contemplation or hope of the United States eventually
joining the Berne Union.60 Since acceding to the Berne Convention,
the United States has technically complied with the requirements of
providing post-death protection for moral rights by its enactment of
the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).6 1 This amendment to the U.S.
Copyright Act added the rights of attribution and integrity to works of
visual art.62 After successful lobbying of Congress by the U.S. motion
picture industry, which opposed the extension of the Copyright Act to
cinema, motion pictures were not included within VARA's
provisions.63
55. Can. Copyrt. Act, supra note 38, § 14.2.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1988).
57. DaSilva, supra note 23, at 11.
58.' RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 473-74.
59. RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 462. Because many common law countries did not
provide moral rights in their copyright laws when Article 6bis was first proposed at the
Rome Conference in 1928, it was left open for them to protect droit moral outside of the
copyright area. Id.
60. Id. at 466.
61. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1991) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C., particularly §§ 101, 106A, 113(d)); see Edward J.
Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward A Federal System of Moral Rights
Protection for Visual Art, 39 CAm. U. L. REv. 945 (1990); Russ VerSteeg, Federal Moral
Rights for Visual Artists: Contract Theory and Analysis, 67 WASH. L. REv. 827 (1992);
Joseph Zuber, Do Artists Have Moral Rights?, 21 J. ARTS MoHT. & L. 284 (1992).
62. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A, 113(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)
63. A "work of visual art" is-
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single, [or] in a lim-
ited edition ...
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only...
A work of visual art does not include-
(A)(i) any posteri .... motion picture or other audio visual work .... data
base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication
(B) any work made for hire ....
1996]
The United States avoided joining the Berne Union because the
Berne Convention provides for the protection of moral rights. U.S.
copyright laws were thought to be inconsistent with droit moral, and
had long required many of the formalities which the Union specifi-
cally forbids.' By joining the Berne Union, the United States hoped
to regain a position of leadership in international copyright protec-
tion.65 With the rise of other developed industrial nations, and be-
cause it left UNESCO6 6 in 198467 and could no longer exert much
sway under the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC),6a adminis-
tered by UNESCO,6 9 the U.S. government decided that it could better
influence other nations regarding intellectual property protection
through the Berne Union.70 The significance of this move will become
even more apparent when the recent round of trade agreements are
examined infra.
Some commentators regard the United States' joining of the
Berne Union as a political move, lacking any real intent to abide by
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993) (emphasis added).
Despite pleas from filmmakers such as Woody Allen, and actor Jimmy Stewart (speak-
ing on behalf of film director Frank Capra), Congress chose to ignore the issue of the
colorization of such classic black and white movies as Capra's "It's a Wonderful Life," and
John Huston's "The Maltese Falcon." William H. Honan, Artists, Newly Militant, Fight for
Their Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1988, at C29. Cablecaster Ted Turner, who had
purchased much of MGM studio's library of films, and was one of the initial proponents of
colorizing B&W films, was voiceful in his opposition to moral rights, id., as was the Motion
Picture Association of America. VerSteeg, supra note 61, at 830. See Suzanne I. Schiller,
Black and White and Brilliant: Protecting Black-and-White Films from Color Recording, 9
HASTINGS CoMmIENr L.J. 523 (1987); Woody Allen et al., Colorization: The Arguments
Against, 17 J. OF ARTS MGMT. & L. 79 (1987); Craig A. Wagner, Note, Motion Picture
Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 628 (1989).
64. David Nimmer, The Impact of Berne on United States Copyright Law, 8 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 27, 30-37, 39 (1989).
65. Id. at 29 ("[A] primary motivation of the United States in joining the Berne Con-
vention was to make an international statement about our moral posture in adhering to the
world's foremost multilateral copyright treaty."). Mr. Nimmer is extremely critical of the
United States "minimalist" approach in adhering to the Berne Convention. Id. at 28-29.
His article implicitly raises the question of what international political capital can be
gained by stating one position to the world while practicing the opposite in one's backyard.
66. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
67. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 223 (1986).
68. Id. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No.
3324, 735 U.N.T.S. 368, revised July 24, 1971, Paris Text, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868
[hereinafter UCC]. The United States is still a member of the UCC. Originally, the UCC
was created to bridge the gap between the Berne Union countries, countries in the Ameri-
cas, and common law countries, including the United States, which provide very different
types of authors' rights. STEWART, supra note 2, § 6.01. Consequently, there are few moral
rights provisions included in the UCC. Id. § 6.28.
69. STEWART, supra note 2, at § 6.01.
70. Nimmer, supra note 64, at 29.
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the moral rights requirements of Article 6bis.71 Indication of this can
be seen not only in the legislative history of the BCIA,7 a but also in
the final agreements reached in NAFTA and the Trade Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of the Uruguay Round
of negotiations of the GATI, where moral rights were specifically ex-
cluded.73 Understanding the United States' aversion to droit moral
requires a closer look at the theory underlying U.S. copyright protec-
tion, especially in light of free speech and trade concerns.
II
The U.S. Copyright System in Perspective
United States Copyright Law, enacted under the authority
granted Congress by the U.S. Constitution,74 protects "original works
71. See Nimmer, supra note 64, at 29-30; VerSteeg, supra note 61, at 830, 832-33.
72. The House concluded that the U.S. was already in compliance with the moral
rights requirements of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34 & n.67 (1988) [hereinafter H.R.Rep]; in agreement is Strauss, supra note
30, at 141. The reasons given by the House are well summarized by the following:
[T]here is a composite of laws in this country that provides the kind of protection
envisioned by Article 6bis. Federal laws include 17 U.S.C. § 106, relating to de-
rivative works; 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2), relating to distortions of musical works used
under the compulsory license respecting sound recordings; 17 U.S.C. § 203, relat-
ing to termination of transfers and licenses and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
relating to false designations of origin and false descriptions. State and local laws
include those relating to publicity, contractual violations, fraud and misrepresen-
tation, unfair competition, defamation, and invasion of privacy. In addition, eight
states have recently enacted specific statutes protecting the rights of integrity and
paternity in certain works of art. Finally, some courts have recognized the
equivalent of such rights.
H. R. REP., supra, at 34.
Examination of this contentious issue is beyond the scope of this article. However, it
must be noted that although much of the above statement is correct, it ignores the difficul-
ties authors face in defending their moral rights through the various and diffuse doctrines
listed. Vaver, supra note 38, at 770-72. Many of the state law provisions mentioned are
common law causes of action that do not survive the death of the author. Though para-
graph (2) of Article 6bis recognizes that common law countries like the United States are
practically expected to provide moral rights protection outside of the copyright area,
Berne, supra note 1, art. 6bis, par. (2), it has been argued that equating common law eco-
nomic rights to the personal rights inherent in droit moral is inconsistent and harmful to
the doctrine. Vaver, supra note 38, at 767-70, 772-74. Finally, as Russ VerSteeg points out,
paragraph (3) of Article 6bis requires a national law of moral rights instead of the state
patchwork now existent. VerSteeg, supra note 61, at 833. "The means of redress for safe-
guarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the coun-
try where protection is claimed." Berne, supra note 1, art. 6bis, par. (3) (emphasis added).
It is the United States that acceded to the Berne-Union, not its individual states.
73. See infra Part IV.
74. "The Congress shall have the Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."75 In con-
formance with Article 5 of the Berne Convention,76 registration with
the Copyright Office is no longer a prerequisite for protection under
U.S. Copyright Law. 7 Thus, the maxim has arisen that as soon as a
work is written down or recorded, it is copyrighted.78
United States Copyright grants its owner certain exclusive rights
that are listed in section 106 of the Copyright Act.79 As the Supreme
Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc."° noted:
"[t]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private bene-
fit."''s  In other words, copyright is not property, in the same way that
real and personal property are commonly viewed in the United
States. 2 In the House Report to the 1909 Copyright Act, the prede-
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
76. Berne, supra note 1, art. 5 (2) ("The enjoyment and exercise of these rights shall
not be subject to any formality..
77. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
79.
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive right to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecoids;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (emphasis added).
It should be noted that none of the exclusive rights granted by the U.S. Copyright Act,
other than those found in section 106A and 113(d), supra note 61-63 and accompanying
text, explicitly include moral rights. Except possibly for the right to distribute copies, id.
§ 106(3), which implicitly recognizes a limited right of divulgation, and § 106(2), Which
requires permission to create a derivative work, § 106 is a list of the authors' economic
rights. Supra note 30.
80. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
81. Id. at 429.
82. Eminent copyright Professor (later Judge) Kaplan said, on this subject:
To say that copyright is 'property,' although a fundamentally unhistorical state-
ment, would not be boldly misdescriptive if one were prepared to acknowledge
that there is property and property, with few if any legal consequences extending
uniformly to all species and that in practice the lively questions are likely to be
whether certain consequences ought to attach to a given piece of so-called prop-
erty in given circumstances.
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 78 (1967).
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cessor of the current Act, as quoted in Sony,8 3 the Judiciary Commit-
tee of the House of Representatives stated:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms
of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the au-
thor has in his writings.... but upon the ground that the welfare of
the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will
be promoted by securing to authors for the limited periods the ex-
clusive rights to their writings .... 84
This is in marked contrast to the authors' rights regimes found in most
civil law countries, especially France and Mexico, which base authors'
rights protection on a natural right in the author or on a right in the
author's personality.8 5
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,86 the U.S.
Supreme Court's latest analysis of the protections afforded by the
Copyright Act, clearly establishes the social purpose served by
copyright.
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors, but "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Accord, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). To this end, copyright assures authors the
right to their original expression, but also encourages others to build
freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by the work.
Harper & Row, supra, 471 U.S. at 556-557. This principle, known as
the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all
works of authorship .... This result is neither unfair nor unfortu-
nate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of
science and ar87
Feist dealt with the issue of whether the white pages of a phone
book were copyrightable subject matter.8 8 The Court held that white
pages consisted of facts arranged in an unoriginal manner, and as
such, were not protected by the Copyright Act.8 9 Nowhere in its opin-
ion did the Court express concern with the fact that the defendants,
who had admittedly copied from plaintiff's phone listing, had not
named plaintiffs as the source for the listing. The right of attribution
or any other moral rights were simply not in question.
It is interesting to point out the similar historical background in
the English licensing system shared by the free speech protections
83. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429-30 n.10.
84. Id (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) (emphasis added)).
85. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
86. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
87. Id. at 349-50 (emphasis added) (full citations omitted).
88. Id. at 344.
89. Id. at 350.
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found in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 90 and the law
of copyright. When the First Amendment was first construed by the
Supreme Court, it was viewed primarily as targeting prior restraints
on publication.91 As the Court said in Lovell v. City of Griffen,
G.A. :92 "Itlhe struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily di-
rected against the power of the licensor. ' 93 In England, this power
had predominantly been given to the Stationers' Company.94 "The
primary interest of the state in granting this monopoly was not, how-
ever, the securing of Stationers' property rights but the establishment
of a more effective system for governmental surveillance of the
press.195 Thus, it is not surprising to find that even today, prior re-
straints imposed on the press in the United States incur the highest
prohibition under First Amendment theory.96
The emergence of copyright in England occurred shortly after
governmental licensing of the press died due to the unpopularity of
licensing.97 Ironically, rise of copyright and the first copyright statute,
the Statute of Anne of 1710,98 came about through a campaign by
deceit. The Stationers' Company, by campaigning for the protection
of the authors' literary property, through the "copy-right," was truly
campaigning for the reassertion of its monopoly as sole provider of
literary content.99 When the Statute of Anne was passed, the Station-
ers' Company was effectively circumvented by a Parliament specifi-
cally concerned with avoiding censorship.' This segues into the
90. "Congress shall make no law..., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.... '" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
91. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
92. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
93. Id. at 451.
94. ROSE, supra note 25, at 12.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (The Pentagon
Papers Case); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its consti-
tutional validity.").
97. ROSE, supra note 25, at 31-32, 36.
98. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
99. ROSE, supra note 25, at 42-48.
100. Id. at 47. Extending the analogy, similar arguments for protecting the livelihood of
U.S. authors were made by the United States during all of its recent trade negotiations.
The argument is similar to that of the Stationers' Company in the sense that the true foci of
the United States concerns were, in fact, the industries that have arisen to take advantage
of copyright protection, such as film, publishing, music, and broadcasting. See, e.g., Letter
from Jack Valenti, President and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of
America, to the House Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Trade 3 (Sept. 17,
1992) quoted in Stephen R. Konigsberg, Think Globally, Act Locally: North American Free
Trade, Canadian Cultural Industry Exemption, and The Liberalization of the Broadcast
Ownership Laws, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & Er. L.J. 281, 305-06 (1994). This analysis is not
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other theories underlying the protection of the freedom of speech
under the First Amendment. Justice Brandeis was of the view that the
protection of free speech could be an end in itself.''
Most, if not all, of the bases said to underlie the First Amendment
were best raised by Justice! Brandeis in his famous concurrence in
Whitney v. California.°2 To quote at length one of the most powerful
statements ever made by a United States Supreme Court Justice,
Brandeis stated:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbi-
trary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They
believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordina-
rily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doc-
trine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a funda-
mental principle of American government. They recognized the
risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that
order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope, and im-
agination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate;
that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discus-
sion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force
in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and
assembly should be guaranteed. 10 3
The above paragraph is Brandeis' extrapolation of what Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes first termed the "free trade in ideas."'01 4 The
First Amendment acts as a base for good government, as a check to
bad government, as a road to truth, as a safety valve against repres-
sion, as a means of self-fulfillment and expression, and as an end in
and of itself.1 5
intended to suggest that U.S. industry or the government is using its international trade
powers to censor opposing views.
101. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 375-76.
104. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
105. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 940-41 (4th ed.,
1991).
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Why then does not the First Amendment prevail over the Copy-
right Act which creates a grant withdrawing certain speech from the
marketplace of ideas? The answer lies in the words "marketplace of
ideas," with, for the Supreme Court, an emphasis on the marketplace.
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., °6 the U.S.
Supreme Court found that the distinction made by the Copyright Act
between ideas and expression 0 7 struck a balance by leaving to the
public domain important tools for free speech while at the same time
protecting an author's form of expression.' 08 Facts and ideas are free.
The crux of the majority's. argument in Harper & Row was that "'[i]f
every volume that was in the public interest could be pirated away by
a competing publisher,... the public [soon] would have nothing worth
reading." ' 1 9 According to the Court: "[T]he Framers intended copy-
right itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a mar-
ketable right to use one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.""'
As the majority in Harper & Row stated, "freedom of thought
and expression 'includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all."'' Thus, if one is going to speak, but is
only willing to do so for a price, copyright will aid in the dissemination
of that speech and prevent unauthorized copying (infringement) by
others. If, under exercise of the First Amendment right to remain si-
lent, speech cannot be voluntarily obtained without remuneration,
copyright provides the economic incentive to release that expression
to the public." 2 The Speech Clause of the First Amendment does not
prohibit the government from encouraging speech; it only prohibits
the government from discouraging it." 3 The public benefits through
copyright because the marketplace of ideas is a First Amendment end
106. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea..."); Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-51; supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
108. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
109. Id. at 559 (quoting Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering
Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 78 (1971)).
110. Id. at 558.
111. Id. at 559 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
112. There have been some suggestions that copyright law is not as effective in encour-
aging new authorship as it could or should be. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the
Merits of Copyright: The Challenge of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989).
113. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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in itself. 4 Authors are benefited by a system of trade regulation for
the dissemination of their work for profit.115 Arguably, only in this
way can copyright be seen as "the engine of free expression" under
the First Amendment and still be consistent with First Amendment
principles.
Most of the civil law countries that adhere to authors' rights pro-
tection have managed to avoid any possible conflicts between their
free speech provisions and the protection of the expression of their
authors because the issue never arises." 6 Under the French view of
authors' rights, protection of expression is not original to the state but
from the natural right in the author to the property of his or her crea-
tion." 7 The state merely helps in the protection of the property that
results out of that personal authorship. The U.S. system, and that of
other common law jurisdictions, are generally purely creatures of stat-
ute." 8 The purpose of copyright is to benefit society and the market-
114. Supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. But cf. Barbara Ringer, Two Hun-
dred Years of American Copyright Law, in BICENTENARY SYMPOSIUM OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 118 (1976) ("It is harder to determine that the inter-relationship be-
tween a strong copyright protection and individual freedom of expression is one of cause
and effect, but I believe that, on the basis of the historical evidence, a causal relationship
can be shown."),
115. E.g., the U.S. Copyright Act allows authors to exploit their copyrights or com-
pletely sell those rights to another person. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; see also supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
116. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitutional Act of 1982, is
much less absolutist a document than the Amendments to the U.S. Constitution tend to be,
especially where speech is concerned. Part 1 of the Canadian Charter states:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and free-
doms set out in it subject only to such limits prescribed by law as can be demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society.
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:...
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the
press and other media of communication....
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (emphasis added).
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada put meaning to the above emphasized words
when, though recognizing that content of speech is protected by the Charter, it held sexu-
ally explicit materials could be degrading to women, and thus prescribable under the over-
ride clause. Regina v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.). This is not to say that obscene
materials are not barred in the United States. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
It only demonstrates that the Canadian Charter has an explicit escape hatch which the First
Amendment does not.
Mexico's Constitution sends much the same message:
.Freedom of writing and publishing writings on any subject is inviolable. No law
or authority may establish censorship, require bonds from authors or printers, or
restrict the freedom of printing, which shall be limited only by the respect due to
the right of privacy, morals and public peace ....
Const. title I, art. 7 (Mex.) (emphasis added).
117. Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
118. Supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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place of ideas by providing an economic incentive for authors to
create. 119
It is ironic that although the French political system was more
influenced by Marxist theory2 ° and the United States by Lockean
principles of property, 12 1 the U.S. copyright system is more socialist,
and the French system more property based. This is mainly due to the
fact that the civil law system introduced by the French is more con-
cerned with the protection of the author, while the common law copy-
right system is more concerned with encouraging industry. The
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizens of 1789
shows this emphasis for the individual, 22 while free speech theory in
the United States is based on economic theory.123
CFTA and NAFTA
With the election of the Conservative party in 1984, led by Brian
Mulroney, Canada's economic policy of self-sufficiency in trade, as ad-
vocated by the Liberal Party under the leadership of Pierre Elliott
124 %.AitTrudeau, continued its slow demise to oblivion. 25 In 1986, as part
of an overall strategy towards more open trade, Canada began talks
with the United States that eventually led to the Canada/U.S. Free
Trade Agreement (CFTA). 126 Two elements of the Agreement, found
119. Supra note 87 and accompanying text.
120. Supra note 50.
121. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individu-
ality in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
122. "The unrestrained communication of thoughts or opinion being one of the most
precious rights of man, every citizen may speak, write and publish freely, provided he be
responsible for the abuse of the liberty, in the cases determined by law." DECLARATION OF
THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZENS (emphasis added). art. II (Fr.).
123. See, e.g., supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
124. Trudeau was Prime Minister of Canada from 1969 to 1979, and then again from
1980 to 1984. Early on in his tenure, Trudeau was a very charismatic leader. He is fondly
remembered for a remark he once made in the early 1970s to a group of U.S. visitors in
Canada: "Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter
how friendly and even-tempered the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt."
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, quoted in Michael T. Kaufman, What it Means to Be Canadian, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1988, § 2, at 33.
125. Konigsberg, supra note 100, at 297-98. That policy, begun after a White Paper
issued by the Department of External Affairs in 1972 suggested that "Canada ... pursue a
comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and
other aspects of its national life and in the process reduce the ... Canadian vulnerability
[to the United States,]" was first advocated by then Secretary of State for External Affairs
Mitchell Sharp. Secretary of State of External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, Canadian-US. Rela-
tions: Options for the Future, Irr'L PERSP., Autumn 1972, at 1.
126. Konigsberg, supra note 100, at 298.
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in the "Other Provisions" section, are important for present purposes.
The first is that, though the United States and Canada did not come to
agreement on intellectual property issues, they did agree that "the
Parties shall cooperate in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations and in other international forums to improve protection
of intellectual property. ' 127 The second, and probably one of the most
contentious issues during negotiations, 28 was the question of the ap-
plicability of CFTA to cultural industries. Though Canada made it
clear that a necessary condition for any agreement would be the exclu-sion of cultural industries,'129 Article 2005 of chapter 21 of the Agree-
ment shows that total exclusion was not obtained. 130
1. Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agree-
ment ....
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, a Party
may take measures of equivalent commercial effect in response to
actions that would have been inconsistent with this Agreement but
for paragraph one.131
With this Article, however, the Canadian government was able to as-
sure Canadians that culture 32 was not part of the agreement with the
United States. Likewise, the United States could report to Con-
gress 133 that it had retained the right to retaliate against Canada
should Canada ever impose protective measures on its cultural indus-
tries. 134 Unlike the situation in GATT, as will be later examined, the
parties did not merely agree to disagree. Instead, Canada and the
127. CFrA, supra note 3, ch. 21, art. 2004.
128. Konigsberg, supra note 100, at 286.
129. Id.
130. CFTA, supra note 3, chap. 21, art. 2005.
131. Id.
132. A cultural industry was defined as:
[An enterprise engaged in any of the following activities:
a) the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals, or news-
papers in print or machine readable form but not including the sole activity of
printing or typesetting any of the foregoing,
b) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video recordings,
c) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or video music
recordings,
d) the publication, distribution, or sale of music in print or machine readable
form, or
e) radio communication in which the transmissions are intended for direct recep-
tion by the general public, and all radio, television and cable television broadcast
undertakings and all satellite programming and broadcasting network services.
CFrA, supra note 3, ch. 21, art. 2012.
It is remarkable that visual arts such as painting and photography were not included in
the list, nor were Works of folklore, such as Inuktitut (Eskimo) or First Nations art.
133. Unlike NAFTA, the U.S. public paid little attention to CFTA.
134. See McPherson, supra note 5, at 190. Of course, the issue of existing protections
was also overlooked.
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United States explicitly agreed that cultural industries were a special
part of the Agreement; one, however, that would not have the benefit
of CFTA's dispute settlement provisions, but which left each side
open to "equivalent" retaliation. 135 While this may have looked polit-
ically sound, it was widely viewed as economically inconsistent with
free trade principles. 36 For many in the Canadian film industry, this
part of the Agreement was seen as a capitulation. 37 How could cul-
tural industries be deemed excluded from CFTA when CFTA made
retaliation an acceptable trade response to the nation's prerogative of
fostering its.own self-definition? Allowance of such retaliation was an
affront to Canadian cultural autonomy.
There are few, if any, nations that do not protect or subsidize at
least some aspect of their cultural industries, 38 and the United States
is no exception. The federal government subsidizes the arts through
135. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 21, art. 2005.
136. See, e.g., Stacie I. Strong, Banning the Cultural Exclusion: Free Trade and Copy-
righted Goods, 4 DUKE J. COMi. & INT'L L. 93 (1993). Unfortunately, studying in broad
economic terms the impact of the issue of cultural exemptions on trade, just like studying
issues in purely legal terms, leads to tunnel vision and ignorance of important factors.
Strong's difficulties are history and culture. She sees the United States and Canada as
having similar "cultural histories." Id. at 105. Konigsberg, by contrast, has a knowledge of
Canada that would make most Canadians blush, and recognizes the validity of the Cana-
dian wish not to be "American." Konigsberg, supra note 100, at 285-300. Yet, he believes
the answer to easing trade frictions lies in reducing the stringent citizenship requirements
to owning broadcast facilities in the United States. Id. at 315-16. This is a solution, how-
ever, that is as narrow in conception as Strong's economic outlook.
Konigsberg's underlying argument, "that every nation enjoys a sovereign right with
which no other nation may interfere, to regulate as it pleases its own internal domestic
affairs including economic and cultural policies," id. at 285 n.22, is certainly appealing on
the surface. But it is also idealistic since it ignores the reality that multilateral trade agree-
ments, by definition, involve "ceding" exercise of some of that sovereignty in the hopes of
achieving better domestic economic performance through unimpeded trade in a wider
sphere. Cf. S.S. Wimbleton Case, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25. The question becomes
whether cultural self-determination is ever an appropriate bargaining chip in trade
negotiations.
137. See, e.g., MICHAEL POSNER, CANADIAN DREAMS (Canadian Independent Film
Caucus 1993). The reaction of one of Canada's most revered writers is better known:
Canada as a separate but dominated country has done about as well under the
United States as women, worldwide, have done under men; about the only posi-
tion they've ever adopted toward us, country to country, has been the missionary
position, and we were not on top. I guess that's why the national wisdom vis a vis
Them has so often taken the form of lying still, keeping your mouth shut and
pretending you like it. But as part of Them, at least we'd get to vote, eh?. We'd,
sure as heck fit in, we already know more about them than we do about one,
another, or so you'd think.
Margaret Atwood, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 5, 1987, at A7, quoted in MANJUNATH
PENDAKUR, CANADIAN DREAMS & AMERICAN CONTROL: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE CANADIAN FILM INDUSTRY 251 (1990).
138. Because the Americans' commercial success is achieved at the expense of
everyone
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the National Endowment for the Arts, as do state and local govern-
ments with similar programs. 139 The broadcasting industry is regu-
lated by the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which requires that
owners of radio and television broadcast stations be citizens of the
United States. 4 ' Similarly, Canada does not permit more than 10 to
20% foreign ownership of its broadcast facilities. 141 Historically, how-
ever, the United States has provided less protection to its cultural in-
dustries than most other nations. 42 It has been fortunate in having a
strong industrial base and many wealthy patrons to subsidize the arts,
thus alleviating the need for as much governmental intervention. 43 . In
contrast, countries like Canada, France and Mexico have had much
more direct governmental involvement in their cultural industries. 1'"
Consider as an example Canada's film industry. Canada's film
history is one marked by cycles of boom and bust.145 During the
1970s, the federal government provided tax shelters for those willing
to invest in Canadian film production in order to stimulate the flag-
else's (there is no commercially viable film industry, in an unprotected market,
outside the United States), levy has become the norm, rather than the exception,
for the world's film industries. To it we owe Bergman, Truffaut, Bunuel, and most
of our non-American experience.
The countries applying this sanction have no less access to the American market
than Canada. Our fear is based on a myth that somehow, if we are a good branch
plant and forfeit total control of our own market, the Americans will allow us into
theirs where we will have a shot at the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.: The
fact of the matter is that there is no entry to the American market-on a large
scale-and there is little hope of realizing profits from films which do gain entry.
Sandra Gathercole, The Best Film Policy This Country Never Had, in TAKE Two: A TRIB-
OtE TO FILM IN CANADA 42-43 (Seth Feldman ed., 1984).
139. Foi example, New York has the New York State Council for the Arts, and the
Department of Cultural Affairs of the City of New York.
140. 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1988); Konigsberg, supra note 100, at 304-05.
141. Konigsberg, supra note 100, at 315.
142. Rosen, supra note 23, at 179-80.
143. Id. Unfortunately, Rosen's attitude towards the (lack of) historical development
of a strong artist class in the United States displays an amount of cultural priggishness not
commonly encountered in the pages of law reviews. His belief in art for art's sake is to be
commended, and it is a view with which no less a person than Justice Brandeis would have
agreed with. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, to argue that
the U.S has not contributed very much to art is simply to ignore the fact that the commer-
cialism so decried by Rosen, at least in the arts, began in Europe long before it did in the
United States, where it was merely emulated. See, e.g., JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING
83-113 (on the depiction of things in European paintings during the 18th and.19th centu-
ries), 7-33 (on the commercialization of art) (1972). It could be argued that the United
States' lack of pretensions was a much needed breath of fresh, air for art.. Witness Jasper
Johns and Roy Lichtenstein.
144. Konigsberg, supra note 100, at 300-10 (discussing the European Community);
Gathercole, supra note 138, at 45.
145. POSNER, supra note 137.
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ging film industry.'46 This resulted in a sharp increase in the number
of feature films made. Unfortunately, the quality of many of these
films was atrocious. 4 7 In the early 1980s, the amount which an inves-
tor in a film project could deduct or shelter was considerably reduced
and Canadian film production slowed to a trickle.'48 The Canadian
government essentially decided to abandon the feature film market
and instead emphasize aid to television production. Since Canadian
films only commanded three percent of Canadian screens, and the dis-
tribution and exhibition networks were dominated by the United
States, the government decided to spend money on Canadian televi-
sion content, which commanded about twenty percent of broadcast
time.149 Canadian content requirements for broadcasting were
strengthened,'150 and throughout the 1980s, with the aid of Telefilm
Canada,'' Canada developed an industrial base of television, and, in-
directly, film production. 52  Because of the availability of highly
skilled production crews and the strength of the U.S. dollar in Canada,
U.S. film producers increasingly began going north to produce films, a
practice that still exists today.' 53
In 1987, almost simultaneous with the negotiations of the Can-
ada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Communications Minister Flora Mc-
146. PENDAKUR, supra note 137, at 169-93; Scott Haggett, Canadian Movie.Makers
Come of Age, FIN. PosT, Sept. 9, 1993, at 15.
147. One Canadian film critic, leaving after seeing part of a Canadian film at the
Cannes festival in 1980, remarked that he felt like throwing up. Haggett, supra note 146, at
15. Another critic had this to say about the era:
From the Twenties on, Canadians bought at American movies an image of them-
selves that has nothing to do with their own reality. But given the opportunity to
bring their disparate experiences to the screen, to engender their own dreams and
to immortalize their own mythologies, they opted in most instances for slavish
imitation of American dreams, for a crude approximation of American mythol-
ogy and its attendant iconography.
Jay Scott, Burnout in the Great White North, in TAKE Two: A TRIBUTE TO FILM IN CAN-
ADA 34 (Seth Feldman ed., 1984).
148. Haggett, supra note 146, at 15.
149. The State and/or/of Canadian Cinema: A Debate Around "The Cinema We Need",
CINEMA CAN., July-Aug. 1985, at 26.
150. Konigsberg, supra note 100, at 292. Canadian television content levels were in-
creased to 60% of all day programming, and 50% for evening, or prime time programming.
Id.
151. Telefilm Canada is a federal film and television funding agency that provides finan-
cial assistance to Canadian television and filmmakers and Canadian co-productions. Nel-
son Wyatt, Telefilm Sets New Record For Help, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 4, 1992; Canada
Newswire, Telefilm Canada Budget to Be Slashed by 10% for 1993-94 and 1994-95 (Dec. 7,
1992).
152. PENDAKUR, supra note 137, at 214-15.
153. Clyde H. Farnsworth, The Versatile City That Film Makers Like to Film, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1993, at D15.
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Donald tabled a bill in the Canadian House of Commons that would
have boosted the Canadian film industry considerably.154 In the past,
U.S. film distributors considered Canada as part of their own film
market and contracted away the distribution rights for U.S. films as
such. 5 ' The bill, dubbed the Federal Distribution Bill, would have
ended this practice, forcing many film producers to deal with Cana-
dian film distributors in order to license their films in Canada. 156 The
government's hope was that the bill would create a distribution infra-
structure whose profits would remain in Canada to finance more Ca-
nadian film production and exhibition. 57 The reaction from the U.S.
film industry was swift. Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA), went to Ottawa to speak with Flora
McDonald. Valenti was reportedly "lectured" by her and told there
would be no change of course.' 58 When McDonald rebuffed Valenti's
suggestion that Canada place a tax on its box office to support its film
industry, Valenti turned to Washington. 159 Soon, even President Ron-
ald Reagan became involved, voicing concerns to Prime Minister Mul-
roney during a summit conference in Ottawa in 1987.161 The U.S.
Congress passed a resolution condemning the Canadian bill with un-
veiled threats that CFTA would be derailed if the Federal Distribution
Bill became law.' 61
In 1988, however, the Federal Distribution Bill died quietly when
the House of Commons adjourned for the federal elections. 62 The
major campaign issue was whether Canada should enter into CFTA
with the United States. 63 The Conservatives, who had initiated the
talks, won a handy majority. Though there was talk in the Communi-
cations Ministry until 1991 of reintroducing the Distribution Bill,
nothing ever came to pass. It is highly doubtful that such a bill could
have been passed in Canada without pressure being placed on the
U.S. government by the strong film lobby headed by Valenti to retali-
ate under the CFTA cultural "exemption" provision."6 For all intents
and purposes, Canadians were doomed to have practically no access
154. PENDAKUR, supra note 137, at 269.
155. lan Austen, Hollywood Goes to War, MACLEAN'S, June 22, 1987, at 53.
156. PENDAKUR, supra note 137, at 264-66.
157. Id. at 264-65.
158. Austen, supra note 155, at 54.
159. Id.
160. Id
161. PENDAKUR, supra note 137, at 271.
162. Id. at 275.
163. For an excellent study on the 1988 Canadian Federal elections see DAVID TARAS,
THE NEWSMAKERS (1990).
164. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 21, art. 2005; supra note 130-137 and accompanying notes.
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to the exhibition market to show their own films in Canada.1.65 Only a
handful of Canadian filmmakers, including such notables as David
Cronenberg, Atom Egoyan, Brian McDonald, and Quebec film-
makers Denys Arcand and Jean-Claude Lauzon, could hope to be
seen on anything other than Canadian television screens. Admittedly
they are an impressive group. The fact that, other than the first two
named, Canadian filmmakers work so sporadically leaves pause to
wonder.
During NAFTA negotiations, the United States again pressured
Canada to drop the cultural industries exemption but was unsuccess-
ful.'66 Again, the political atmosphere in Canada would have made
passage of such a deal practically impossible.'67 But it became clear as
the negotiations proceeded, that the United States had another target
in mind when complaining about the cultural exemption: Europe.168
The United States was worried that the Europeans might try to use
Canada's cultural exclusion as a shield at the GATT talks, as the
French eventually did.1 69
One remarkable aspect of NAFTA, practically ignored by the
press, is the strong intellectual property protection it forces Canada,
Mexico, and the United States to abide by.170 Mexico has long had a
165. The amount of screen space devoted to Canadian films in Canada has been esti-
mated to be less than three percent. U.S. movies make up the bulk of the Canadian film
market. PENDAKUR, supra note 137, at 266; Brian D. Johnson, Casting Hollywood North,
MACLEAN'S, Feb. 17, 1986, at 34.
166. Canada: A Free Trader Draws the Line At Culture, FIN. PosT., July 29, 1991.
167. Canadians were generally more opposed to NAFTA than they had been of the
CFrA, blaming the latter for the current severe depression in Canada. Brian Mulroney's
popularity declined to a depth generally unheard of in western democratic politics. Yet the
Conservatives still had a strong majority in the House and the deal was passed before
Mulroney stepped down as Prime Minister in June. Elections were held in October 1993,
and the Liberals, under Jean Chretien, won a sweeping majority, partly on a promise to
renegotiate NAFTA. What little was changed is not worth mention here.
The situation for new Democratic President Bill Clinton in the United States was not
much easier. Faced with a deal negotiated by his Republican predecessor, Clinton was
looking at a divided Democratic majority in the House opposed to the Agreement, fearing
mostly what Presidential candidate H. Ross Perot had described during the election cam-
paign as the "sucking sound" of U.S. jobs disappearing to Mexico where wages were lower.
Nevertheless, after the President strenuously lobbied individual House members, the
House of Representatives passed the bill by a comfortable margin on November 17. The
Senate soon gave its assent, and President Clinton signed the Agreement on December 18,
1993, allowing NAFTA to come into effect on January 1, 1994. See John Daly, Down to the
Wire, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 22, 1993, at 34; John Daly, The Fight for Open Markets,
MACLEAN'S, Nov. 29, 1993, at 32-35; Deirdre McMurdy, The Great Global Trade-Off,
MACLEAN'S, Dec. 27, 1993, at 49.
168. Supra note 166; Matthew Fraser, A Question of Culture: The Canadian Solution
Resolves a GATT Standoff, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 27, 1993, at 50-51.
169. Id.
170. NAFTA, supra note 6, chap. 17.
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history of piracy within its borders.' 7 ' Even before NAFTA was com-
pleted, Mexico passed legislation that increased its levels of intellec-
tual property protection.'72 As had Canada during the mid-1980s, 73
Mexico came to realize that isolation was not the answer to its eco-
nomic difficulties and decided to turn to the increasingly interrelated
global trade to boost its economy. 74 Its intellectual property legisla-
tion was seen as a positive sign of its intentions in negotiating the
NAFTA trade pact. 75 The intellectual property provisions of Chapter
17 of NAFTA build upon the draft agreement reached during the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) nego-
tiations of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. 76 Consequently, they
will be examined side by side.
IV
Intellectual Property Under NAFrA and GATT
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. government was
urged by various domestic copyright industries to increase pressure on
various countries to enforce or enact stronger intellectual property
laws to protect U.S. goods from piracy.' 77
In response, the government took a dual approach to the prob-
lem. '7 8 The first was to address the issue on a bilateral basis. The
Trade Act of 1984179 was enacted to give more authority to the United
States Trade Representative Office (USTR) in the area of intellectual
property trade disputes. 80 Section 301 of the Act made a nation's
inadequate intellectual property protection a ground for unilateral re-
taliatory trade action by the United States.18 ' The second was to have
171. John B. McKnight & Carlos Muggenburg, Mexico's New Intellectual Property Re-
gime, 27 INT'L LAW. 27, 29 (1993).
172. Id.
173. Supra note 124-126 and accompanying text.
174. McKnight & Muggenburg, supra note 171, at 28.
175. Id.
176. Charles S. Levy & Stuart M. Weiser, The NAFTA: A Watershed for Protection of
Intellectual Property, 27 INT'L LAW. 671, 672 (1993).
177. TERENCE P. STEWART, THE GAT' URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY
2255 (1993).
178. Id. at 2255, 2259.
179. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 9-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
180. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(5) (1988).
181. A "super" 301 was passed by Congress in 1988 to place even more urgency on
intellectual property issues, providing for the United States Trade Representative to iden-
tify countries that did not enforce or did not have any protection for intellectual property
rights (China, for example, did not have a copyright law until 1990) and to begin bilateral
negotiations within a strict time period before retaliatory action would occur. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2242 (1988); STEWART, supra note 177, at 2257; Levy & Weiser, supra note 176, at 671
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intellectual property protection included within the Uruguay Round
of the GATT.182 The latter was not easy to accomplish. The process
began at the GATr Ministerial Meeting of 1982 when U.S. Trade
Representative William Brock suggested that negotiations should be-
gin for a Code that would prohibit the counterfeiting of goods.' 83 De-
veloping countries such as Brazil and India vehemently opposed the
U.S. proposal, arguing that the GATT's jurisdiction did not include
intangible goods and that intellectual property was within the purview
of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).184
A study program "on the trade aspects of commercial counter-
feiting" 185 was announced in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, and an
Expert Group was established to study the effect of counterfeit goods
on international trade two years later at the 40th Session of the Con-
tracting Parties of GAT.' 86 Despite opposition by developing coun-
tries, by the time proposals were accepted for the 1986 Ministerial
Declaration on the Uruguay Round, the United States, with support
from Japan, managed to have all intellectual property, not just coun-
terfeiting of trademarked goods, accepted as one of the dozen or so
subjects for negotiations in the new round of trade talks. 87
Inclusion of TRIPs in the Uruguay round would eventually prove
to be quite a coup for the United States. Since leaving UNESCO in
1984, and not then being a member of the Berne Union, the United
States had essentially become a lone person out among industrialized
nations in the area of international copyright relations. 88 One of the
major complaints in this area from the United States and other na-
tions had been about the lack of effective enforcement and dispute
resolution procedures under the Berne and U.C.C. conventions.
89
n.1; Douglas Jehl, Clinton Makes No Progress With Beijing, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at
A8.
182. STEWART, supra note 177, at 2260-61.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2261. WIPO is a United Nations organization created in 1967 to take over
the administration of various intellectual property treaties, including the Berne Conven-
tion. RiCKETSON, supra note 31, at 123.
185. STEWART, supra note 177, at 2261.
186. Id. at 2261-62.
187. Id. at 2262-63.
188. Supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
189. STEWART, supra note 177, at 2253. Countries had every reason to complain. As
Stephen Stewart has pointed out, all multilateral treaties on authors' rights today abide by
the principle of national treatment. STEWART, supra note 2, § 3.15. What this means is
that the level of protection a work can be expected to maintain will usually depend on the
country where the protected work is located. Id. Thus, if Germany provides a term of
protection of 70 years post-author death, and Canada provides 50, different copies of the
same work can get varying terms of protection depending on where they are located. This
explains why some cases brought under moral rights principles in the United States have
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With the TRIPs negotiations, the United States hoped that these con-
tentious issues could be dealt with through GATT.9 ° In this en-
deavor, the United States succeeded. With the completion of the
Uruguay Round, GAIT, later renamed the World Trade Organization
(WTO), had an agreement on TRIPs which provided for dispute reso-
lution under ordinary WTO rules. 9' Suddenly, international copy-
right protection was no longer solely the domain of UNESCO and
WIPO; they were effectively replaced by the WTO and its forum to
settle disputes.
The most important provision on copyright protection in the
TRIPs agreement is that all "members shall comply with Articles 1-21
and the Appendix of the Berne Convention (1971). "1192 By the time
the Members of the WTO comply with this provision, it is likely that
many more nations will become members of the Berne Union, 93 thus
marking a significant advance in the development of international
copyright law.' 94 However, the agreement does not require joining
the Union, only compliance with the Berne Convention's substantive
been lost, but have been won in a different country. DaSilva, supra note 23, at 1-3. The
advantages of national treatment is that it provides a certain measure of certainty and
assures local courts that they will not be judging cases based on law with which they may
be unfamiliar. Cary H. Sherman & David E. Korn, Overview of Major Principles in Inter-
national Intellectual Property Law, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY LAW 9 (1991). The disadvantage of national treatment, especially where disputes
between countries are not quickly settled or otherwise taken care of, is that individual
countries with low levels of protection will be able to take advantage of works from coun-
tries with higher levels of protection to the disadvantage of the other country's copyright
owner(s). Id. Again, the moral rights cases prove the point.
Though the Berne Convention abides by the principle of national treatment, it also
provides for certain minima by which Union members must abide. Berne, supra note 1,
art. 5. Article 6bis is one such minima. When countries do not abide by the minima, and
the administrative agent (WIPO) of the Convention does not, or cannot, act effectively to
obtain compliance, protection risks breaking down. This was the situation complained of
and taken care of by the TRIPs agreement. By providing for dispute resolution procedures
within the GATI', namely Articles XXII and XXIII, there now exists an effective forum to
resolve the hypothetical disputes raised above and throughout this article. GAIT, supra
note 10, arts. XXII & XXIII; TRIPs draft, Apr. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, Intlaw li-
brary. These procedures are beyond the scope of this article.
190. STEWART, supra note 177, at 2260.
191. TRIPs draft, supra note 189, art. 64.
192. Id., art. 9.
193. The Berne Union currently consists of over 80 nations. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 104
(West Supp. 1994).
194. In the sense that the minimum levels of protection provided by Berne and TRIPs
show general and concordant practice of states, an effective grievance procedure will help
establish opinio juris sive necessitatis, and thus an international law of copyright. See North
Sea Continental Cases, (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark) (Federal Republic of
Germany v. Netherlands) 1969 I.C.J. 3. So far, no commentator has been willing to posit
that any international law exists in the area of intellectual property precisely due to na-
tional treatment and lack of consistent practice between states.
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articles.'95 Although alone amongst all the countries involved in its
opposition, the United States managed to have moral rights excluded
from the TRIPs agreement. 196 The agreement reads: ". . . Members
shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of
the rights conferred under Article 6bis of... [the Berne] Convention
or of the rights derived therefrom.' 1 97 With this limit, the United
States can continue to avoid the Article 6bis requirements of protec-
tion of moral rights since the enforcement measures of the WTO will
not apply.
Even before the Uruguay Round was completed, the TRIPs
agreement was showing its influence in other areas, especially the
NAFTA. Most of the negotiations on TRIPs had been completed in
December 1991.198 The agreement was delayed by events (to be ex-
amined later) and by difficulties in other areas of the Uruguay Round,
notably that of agriculture and France's insistence on maintaining
many of the protections and subsidies provided to its politically pow-
erful farmers.' 99 NAFTA took what was called the Dunkel Draft of
the TRIPs agreement 200 and used it as a floor to provide even more
intellectual property protections between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States.
Where the TRIPs agreement is limited by the list of protectable
works found in Article 2 of the Berne Convention, Article 1705 of
NAFTA provides that copyright protection is to be extended to "any
other works that embody original expression," thus allowing for the
protection of emerging technological media of information such as
multi-media works and virtual reality.2 ' This will become very im-
portant in the near future as the United States and Canada are leaders
in these areas: works which will one day be carried over the "informa-
tion superhighway" linked directly to homes.20 2 Like TRIPs, NAFTA
requires that the parties abide by the Berne Convention, at a mini-
mum,20 3 but under NAFTA they must also accede to Berne.20' Thus
195. TRIPs draft, supra note 189, art. 9.
196. Id.; STEWART, supra note 177, at 2282.
197. TRIPs draft, supra note 189, art. 9.
198. STEWART, supra note 177, at 2282.
199. Id. at 2286.
200. Levy & Weiser, supra note 176, at 672.
201. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1705. Both TRIPs and NAFTA extend copyright pro-
tection to computer programs under Berne, an important development since, until that
time, Mexico had believed computers to be outside the purview of the Berne Convention.
Levy & Weiser, supra note 176, at 673.
202. Edmund L. Andrews, Big Risk and Cost Seen in Creating Data Superhighway, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 1994, at C17.
203. NAFTA, supra note 6, arts. 1701(2), 1702; TRIPs draft, supra note 189, art. 9.
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far, Canada has only acceded to the 1928 Rome round of the Berne
Convention.2 "5 Both the United States and Mexico have acceded to
the 1971 Paris round, and the 1979 amendments, the latest binding
action by the Union.2 °6 NAFTA requires Canada to accede to the
latest round, thus requiring some changes to its copyright law.
Although the countries are required to provide these protections as a
minimum, again the United States has managed to avoid protecting
the moral rights found in 6bis of Berne. In an annex to NAFTA's
chapter on intellectual property, it is stated that, "this Agreement con-
fers no rights and imposes no obligations on the United States with
respect to Article 6bis of the Berne convention, or the rights derived
from that Article. 20 7
Since the moral rights provisions of the Berne Convention do not
apply to the United States (they do apply both to Canada and Mex-
ico), one provision not included in TRIPs, and sure to be of aid to the
U.S. motion picture industry, is Article 1705.208 Paragraph (3) of that
article provides for the free alienation of an author's economic rights,
including contracts of employment, to be exercisable by the end
owner as it pleases. 2 9 Thus, a U.S. film producer filming in Canada or
Mexico would not have to fear limits placed by a contributor's moral
rights or any possible limits Canada or Mexico could impose on work-
for-hire contracts.210 As in the United States, the film producer would
own all rights in the film free and clear.211 Finally, NAFTA extends its
protections not just to copyrights, but also to what are called neigh-
boring rights.2 12 These rights include the right to lend, rent, or lease
copyrighted works for profit.21 3 The TRIPs agreement did not go this
far, partly due to the fact that Japan already had an advanced rental
system in place, which, at least as to rentals of sound recordings, was
grandfathered.21 4 The fear in not properly protecting neighboring
rights is that it leaves individual countries open to impose levies on
audio and visual works.215 These levies can in turn be used to support
local arts activities or distributed to local performers without consider-
204. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1701(2).
205. See STEWART, supra note 2, § 5.69; Berne, supra note 1.
206. Id.
207. NAFTA, supra note 6, annex 1701.3(2).
208. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1705.
209. Ide
210. Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
211. Id.; supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
212. STEWART, supra note 2, § 7.01.
213. Id.
214. TRIPs draft, supra note 189, art. 11.
215. STEWART, supra note 2, § 3.23.
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ation of the nationality of the works being levied.216 A country as
dominant as the United States is in popular culture is the hardest hit
by such losses in "revenue." It is precisely such levies imposed by the
French at their motion picture box offices, as well as European broad-
cast content requirements, that almost scuttled the Uruguay round of
GATT negotiations.
V
The Experience with France in Perspective
The confrontation between the United States and France over
free trade in cultural industries could have been foreseen after the
negotiations with Canada and Mexico. The problems with France ac-
tually predate CFTA and NAFTA. In 1984, a European Community
(EC) commission released a Green Paper on "Television Without
Frontiers," a study on the importance of broadcasting for EC integra-
tion.21 7 The Green Paper made clear that encouraging broadcasting
between member states, without barriers, was desirable, and that an
effort to protect European culture from outside domination required
EC action.2"' "Frequent warnings are heard about the danger of cul-
tural domination of one country by another in the cinema, although
this is not a problem between Member States. 219 If any doubt ex-
isted as to who was dominating whom, the suggestion that the creation
of a single EC television market was needed as an "essential step if
the dominance of the big American media corporations is to be coun-
terbalanced, '220 made clear that the target was the United States. In
1989, an EC Directive was issued putting these suggestions into effect.
The Directive stated that, "Member States shall ensure where practi-
cable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for Euro-
pean works, within the meaning of Article 6, a majority proportion of
their transmission time. .. ."221 The U.S. House of Representatives
quickly passed a resolution denouncing the EC Directive,222 much like
it had done when Canada attempted to enact legislation to gain a foot-
hold within its own film distribution market.223
216. Id.
217. Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common
Market for Broadcasting, especially Satellite and Cable, COM(84)300 [hereinafter Green
Paper].
218. Id. at 1, 33.
219. Id. at 33.
220. Id.
221. Council Directive, 89/552, art. 4(1), 1989 O.J. (L 298).
222. Konigsberg, supra note 100, at 309 n.175.
223. Supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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The resolution hints at how the United States could act against
the EC (now the European Union) so as to counter EC actions in
protecting its cultural industries. One area will likely be within
GATT "24 (now the World Trade Organization), or through unilateral
use of section 301 of the Trade Act.225 The United States' squabble
with France over motion pictures, which threatened failure of the
whole Uruguay Round, demands closer examination to see what can
be done to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations in the future.
Besides the broadcast content requirements and their quotas, the
U.S. film industry, and its lobby led by MPAA president Jack Valenti,
was disturbed by the fact that France imposed an eleven percent tax
on movie tickets sold in the country.226 The receipts from this tax are
placed into a government controlled fund and distributed to French
and European filmmakers to help produce their films. 227 Hollywood
resented not being able to collect what it saw as its share of these
proceeds.228 After all, sixty percent of French movie screens show
motion pictures made in, or by, the United States.229 The French
pointed out that it was precisely because the United States so domi-
nated its movie screens that the tax was needed to prevent the obliter-
ation of what was left of its film industry.23° Even French President
Francois Mitterand became involved, stating that, "[a] society which
abandons the means of depicting itself would soon be an enslaved
society." 2
3 1
The irony of the whole issue is that as recently as 1987, Valenti
himself was suggesting that Canada use such a levy system in order to
build up its film industry.232 Valenti has become so identified with
U.S. motion picture interests that he actually wound up hurting the
United States delegation in France.233 His ad hominem attacks were
seen by France as an assault against its culture.234 As one journalist
224. Konigsberg, supra note 100, at 309 n.175 (The resolution states in part: "Whereas
such local content requirement violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), specifically Article I relating to most-favored-nation treatment and Article III
relating to national treatment...").
225. Supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text. See, e.g., EDWARD S. YAMBRUSIC,
TRADE-BASED APPROACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1992).
226. Goodell, supra note 12, at 134.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 135.
230. Id.
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232. Supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
233. Goodell, supra note 12, at 136.
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put it: in France, Valenti is "the face of cultural imperialism. '235 The
Canadian film industry has known this for years.236 One reporter, ex-
amining the situation soon after the United States was forced to aban-
don its pressure on France to save the Uruguay Round of
negotiations, explained the event as follows:
In the end, the GATT debacle was a classic example of cross-cul-
tural static in the new-world order. To the French, who tend to trust
government more than business, it's perfectly natural that the gov-
ernment should be involved in film and TV; to Americans, who
trust business over government, that is akin to socialism. In France
the movie business is like a big family; in Hollywood it is like Bos-
nia, full of bloodshed and tribal warlords. So it's no surprise that
when the Americans talked about a trade war, the French took it
personally. What, they didn't understand was -that in Hollywood,
everyone talks like that all the time.2 37
The French were expected to understand this brand of "American-
ism" and just deal with it. In the end, the French turned the tables,
playing the "American" game, and won. Had the arguments not
turned into polemics and personal attacks, the whole issue might have
been avoided, and a suitable compromise reached. As the situation
now stands, the EC feels justified in studying further measures to pro-
tect its cultural industries,238 probably beyond what is necessary, while
the United States contemplates possible retaliatory measures,239 all
because both sides agreed to disagree.24 °
VI
Conclusion
My thesis is that the United States' negotiating strategies in deal-
ing with Canada's cultural exemption in CFTA and NAFTA, and its
reaction to France's refusal to include cultural industries in the final
round of the GATI' negotiations, can be explained by numerous fac-
tors. One important factor is the difference in the protection of au-
thors' rights given in the United States and that of the rest of the
world.24' The United States has refused to extend more than cursory
protection to the moral rights of its authors because doing so contra-
dicts the purposes of the U.S. copyright system to benefit the public
235. Id.
236. Supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
237. Goodell, supra note 12, at 139.
238. Id.
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foremost.242 These purposes have been achieved by providing an eco-
nomic incentive to authors to create original works. Through a system
of trade regulation of the economic rights granted by copyright, the
U.S. Copyright Act has made the United States one of the greatest
purveyors of popular culture in the world.
In the end, all of this has occurred by treating copyrighted works
not as creations imbued with the fights and spirits of their authors, but
simply as any other goods to be bought or sold for profit.243 Since the
United States has rarely been threatened by outside cultural domina-
tion, (and where it has, it has usually succeeded in destroying it) '
U.S. trade, representatives "just don't get it"245 when other countries
take action to protect their cultural heritage in the hopes of protecting
and furthering its development. Since such strategies are seen as pro-
tectionist measures 'against trade in its copyrighted "goods," the
United States fails to understand that such bars to entry are not al-
ways meant as retaliation for having a stronger product, or to protect
a weaker "industry" per se. They are, in fact, mere expressions of a
nation's wish to control its own cultural destiny, which it has a sover-
eign right to exercise.246 The United States would bar this exercise of
a sovereign's prerogative for the sake of better trade, competition,
and, yes, for the sake of free speech. If the increasingly interdepen-
dent international marketplace of ideas tends to favor what U.S. pro-
ducers have to say, free speech, according to Justice Brandeis, is an
end in and of itself.247 To prevent its flow is, well, anti-"American."
Though this might help explain the. U.S. mindset, it does not excuse
the fact that the United States comes across in precisely the fashion it
has historically rebelled against-imperial rulers who impose their
commands without care for the consequences.
242. Supra (Pt. II.)
243. Goodell, supra note 12, at 134.
244. Rosen, supra note 23, at 181.
245. Supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Culture is viewed as a necessary agent in the process of social and political self-
definition, and national identity remains a salient issue in the various debates
over Canadian culture. Culture can increase our determination and potential to
act upon and understand the environment we live in because it delineates our
position in relation to that environment. It shows in who and where we are. In
Canada, where most of the cultural products consumed are imported from other
political and cultural contexts, the situation is regarded as urgent and particularly
pronounced.
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Given the success of the U.S. experiment in copyright and free
speech, one should not expect any changes soon in U.S. trade and
intellectual property policy. The question becomes whether the
United States should be emulated or resisted. That is up to the indi-
vidual countries to decide, on their own or collectively, perhaps
through the new World Trade Organization. But countries like Can-
ada and those in the European Union are not entirely to be blamed
when they bristle at U.S. attempts to dominate their domestic cultural
markets. Once a country loses its ability to define itself to its own
people, it exchanges more than just a tool in its economic policy for
the sake of free trade. It loses an important element of its sover-
eignty. As a consequence, the United States gets branded as a cul-
tural imperialist. Thus, international copyright and trade relations in
the area of cultural industries should be approached cautiously, as a
cultural experience, and not as a game of win, lose, or draw.
